Public service broadcasting in Greece in the era of austerity by IOSIFIDIS, Petros & KATSIREA, Irini
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
RSCAS 2014/42 
Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies 
Centre for Media Pluralism and Media Freedom 
Public Service Broadcasting in Greece in the Era of 
Austerity 
 
Petros Iosifidis and Irini Katsirea 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
  
European University Institute 
Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies 
Centre for Media Pluralism and Media Freedom 
 
 
 
Public Service Broadcasting in Greece in the Era of Austerity 
 
 
 
Petros Iosifidis and Irini Katsirea 
 
EUI Working Paper RSCAS2014/42 
 
   
This text may be downloaded only for personal research purposes. Additional reproduction for other 
purposes, whether in hard copies or electronically, requires the consent of the author(s), editor(s). 
If cited or quoted, reference should be made to the full name of the author(s), editor(s), the title, the 
working paper, or other series, the year and the publisher. 
 
 
 
ISSN 1028-3625 
© Petros Iosifidis and Irini Katsirea, 2014 
Printed in Italy, June 2014 
European University Institute 
Badia Fiesolana 
I – 50014 San Domenico di Fiesole (FI) 
Italy 
www.eui.eu/RSCAS/Publications/ 
www.eui.eu 
cadmus.eui.eu 
  
Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies 
The Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies (RSCAS), created in 1992 and directed by Brigid 
Laffan since September 2013, aims to develop inter-disciplinary and comparative research and to 
promote work on the major issues facing the process of integration and European society. 
The Centre is home to a large post-doctoral programme and hosts major research programmes and 
projects, and a range of working groups and ad hoc initiatives. The research agenda is organised 
around a set of core themes and is continuously evolving, reflecting the changing agenda of European 
integration and the expanding membership of the European Union.  
Details of the research of the Centre can be found on:  
http://www.eui.eu/RSCAS/Research/ 
Research publications take the form of Working Papers, Policy Papers, Distinguished Lectures and 
books. Most of these are also available on the RSCAS website:  
http://www.eui.eu/RSCAS/Publications/ 
The EUI and the RSCAS are not responsible for the opinion expressed by the author(s).  
 
Centre for Media Pluralism and Media Freedom (CMPF) Working Paper Series on 'Freedom and 
Pluralism of the Media, Society and Markets' benefits from contributions from the CMPF’s fellows as 
well as from leading scholars and experienced practitioners interested in and focused on the subject 
matter. The Working Papers Series aims at assessing theoretical issues, specific policies, and 
regulatory questions. 
The Centre for Media Pluralism and Media Freedom is co-financed by the European Union. This 
initiative is a further step in the European Commission’s on-going effort to improve the protection of 
media pluralism and media freedom in Europe and to establish what actions need to be taken at 
European or national levels to foster these objectives. 
The aim of the EUI Centre for Media Pluralism and Media Freedom is to enhance the awareness of the 
importance of freedom and pluralism of the media, to contribute to its protection and promotion and to 
develop new ideas among academics, policy makers, regulators, market stakeholders, journalists, and 
all other directly involved professionals who take part in the public debate. 
 
  
Abstract 
In 2013 the Greek government closed down public broadcaster ERT and made its employees 
redundant as part of the latest public spending cuts imposed to meet the terms of the country’s bailout 
deal. In effect, this has left the commercially dominated Greek broadcasting landscape without a 
public channel and its citizens dependent on the private media sector for the provision of information, 
entertainment and education. One can rightly accuse ERT of lacking clear public interest objectives, 
overstaffing, bureaucracy, wastefulness and over-rewards for senior management, but its abrupt 
closure without consultation and a strategic plan is an attack on free speech and public space by the 
Greek government. ERT required restructuring, but not closing down. Public service broadcasters play 
a crucial role in producing and disseminating public service output that brings citizens together and 
enhances the educational and cultural aspect. This paper is concerned with analysing the reasons 
behind, and consequences of seizing a public service broadcaster such as ERT. After providing a 
background of the historical role and remit of ERT, the article focuses on the legal questions 
surrounding the Council of State decision regarding ERT’s closure. The final part examines the 
legality of ERT’s closure from the EU and ECHR perspective. The central argument is that the closure 
of a public channel limits pluralism and freedom of speech in a market-driven Greek economy. 
Keywords 
Public service broadcasting; media freedom; pluralism; EU Citizenship; ECHR 
 
 1 
Introduction 
The Greek media landscape changed dramatically after the deregulation of broadcasting in the late 
1980s which ended the public broadcasting monopoly. Many media outlets appeared in a small market 
of just 11 million people to the extent that the media landscape today is characterized by an excess of 
supply over demand. From a broadcasting field of two public TV channels and four radio stations, in 
the late 1980s, it has become an overcrowded environment comprising 160 private TV channels and 
1200 private radio stations, all of them lacking an official licence to broadcast (Papathanassopoulos, 
2014). Traditional media, such as newspapers, magazines and the Hellenic Broadcasting Corporation 
ERT, the public service broadcaster, faced an unprecedented challenge as competition increased first 
from powerful (unregulated) commercial analogue broadcasters and then digital media. To address 
sharp decline in sales, the main publishers, helped by a weak regulatory regime, moved to electronic 
media, thereby raising levels of media market concentration. The interdependence between political 
and media elites and the strong clientelistic relations which characterize the Greek political system are 
identified as the main factors behind the ineffective and contradictory nature of broadcasting 
regulatory policies. The ongoing financial crisis and recession has affected the media sector as a whole 
and turned some media outlets financially unsustainable. However, the most dramatic development 
occurred in 2013 with the sudden closure of public service broadcaster (PSB) ERT. 
More specifically, in early June 2013 the Greek government decided to close down ERT and make 
its employees redundant as part of the latest public spending cuts imposed to meet the terms of the 
country’s bailout deal. The rationale behind this unprecedented move was that the public service 
broadcaster was overstaffed and inefficient. In effect, this has left Greece as one of the very few 
Western European countries without a public channel and its citizens entirely dependent on the private 
media sector for the provision of information, entertainment and education. Even though ERT can be 
rightly accused of lacking clear public interest objectives, overstaffing, bureaucracy, wastefulness and 
over-rewards for senior management, its abrupt closure without consultation and a strategic plan is an 
attack on free speech and public space by the Greek government. ERT required restructuring, but not 
closing down. ERT’s 2013 shutdown created an impasse that has divided the Greek nation. PSBs play 
a crucial role in producing and disseminating public service output that brings citizens together and 
enhances the educational and cultural aspect. Greece needs to establish a PSB framework with clear 
public interest objectives in whose independence the Greek public has faith. ERT’s role as an impartial 
public service broadcaster is important especially today given the increase of social tension and the 
rise of the far right in Greece. 
This paper is concerned with analysing the reasons behind, and consequences of seizing a PSB 
such as ERT.
1
 Part one of the paper provides a background of the Greek broadcasting landscape, the 
regulatory framework and the historical role and remit of ERT. The second part focuses on the legal 
questions surrounding the Council of State decision regarding ERT’s closure. The third and final part 
examines the legality of ERT’s closure from the EU and ECHR perspective. The overall argument is 
that in the current Greek political and economic environment one should expect the political elite to 
strengthen the role of the PSB as a guarantor of pluralism and diversity, rather than closing it down. 
  
                                                     
1
 For a more general discussion of the challenges faced by PSBs see (Iosifidis, 2007); (Katsirea, 2008); (idem, 2012).  
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Overview of the Greek broadcasting market 
Television broadcasting in Greece was introduced in 1966, with the first network, ERT (Elliniki 
Radiofonia Tileorasi) broadcasting out of the capital Athens, as a state-owned monopoly. However, 
throughout the 1980s, as the country began to reform and modernize at an unprecedented pace, 
audiences demanded a wider choice of viewing options, following the example of other European 
countries which had already allowed private television. Also, as a member of the European Union, 
Greece had to adapt to TV market liberalization policies pursued by the European Commission. But 
similarities with other European TV markets stop there, for the development of the Greek TV sector is 
distinctly different from that of most EU Member States.  
In more particular, public television took its first steps during a military junta (which ruled Greece 
in 1967-1974), in an environment hostile to the development of objective TV broadcasts.The direct 
dependence of public television on political authority continued even after the restoration of 
democracy and undermined the validity and reliability of ERT. The problem was intensified by 
frequent changes in ERT’s management. This was not conducive to long-term planning and action-
taking. The process of liberalization at the end of the 1980s was conducted without any prior 
economic analysis of the consequences on existing companies. ERTwas the main victim of this de-
facto liberalization as it lost a significant part of its advertising income almost overnight and today has 
in fact the lowest audience share of all European public TV broadcasters.The first attempt to regulate 
the TV sector occurred in the mid-1990s, but even at the time of writing private TV channels are 
operating under a quasi-legal state as they only have provisional licences.The penetration of cable and 
satellite services is negligible, mainly because of the wide availability of free-to-air national channels. 
The restoration of democracy in 1974 brought new impetus to the Greek media landscape and 
television became the dominant medium of information and entertainment, penetrating citizens’ 
everyday life. The TV sector is characterized by cataclysmic changes which have continued with 
undiminished intensity since the end of the 1980s, when the first private television stations MEGA 
(owned by Tyletypos, a consortium of the major newspaper publishers Lambrakis, Tegopoulos and 
Pegasus) and ANT1 (owned by ANT1 TV S.A. with interests also in radio, publishing and recording) 
went on air. Alongside these pioneer private services and (until recently) the three public channels ET-
1, NET and ET-3, there is a multitude of national terrestrial private channels, funded mainly by 
advertising.  
To sum up, the Greek audiovisual landscape has undergone many upheavals since the late 1980s, 
when the market was liberalized and allowed the entry of private radio and television stations. In 2012 
the saturated audiovisual market comprised of three public TV channels (ET-1, NET, ET-3) and 135 
private TV channels (of which the most important national TV channels in terms of market share were 
MEGA, ANT1, ALPHA and STAR). In the following, we will consider the regulatory framework in 
which ERT was operating in the period prior to its demise so readers gain a clearer picture of the 
public broadcaster’s regulatory status during its short life. 
The regulatory framework 
Law 1730/1987 allowed private radio stations and paved the way for the end of state monopoly in TV 
broadcasting. It also united public TV into one corporate body titled ERT S.A.(Hellenic Broadcasting 
Corporation). As stipulated by law, the mission of ERT S.A.was the organization, the exploitation and 
the development of state radio and TV, their contribution to public education and entertainment, as 
well as the presentation of the activities of the Greek Parliament. It was further provided that state 
radio and TV should reach diverse social groups and cover a wide range of fields, since their purpose 
was not to make profits but to promote the public interest.  
Law 1866/1989 was the first step towards abolishing state monopoly by permitting local private 
TV channels and made provision for the establishment of an independent regulatory agency, the 
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National Council of Radio and Television (NCRTV), to oversee the operation of broadcast media, 
grant licences to private stations, and supervise programmes. The Council’s members are appointed by 
political parties represented in Parliament. Its independence was questionable as until 2004 it was 
actually the Ministry of the Press and the Mass Mediathat granted the licences and the NCRTVonly 
had a consultancy role. However, in the context of a major transformation that took place in 2005 the 
Ministry ceased to exist and was replaced by a General Secretary of Information and Communications 
and the NCRTVwas awarded a more independent status (backed by the revised Constitution of 2001 
and Law 2863/2000 – see below), and was made the sole body responsible for licensing radio and TV 
broadcasters. 
In 1993, Law 2173/1993 was finally passed allowing for the establishment of national private TV 
channels, therefore legitimising the stations that had already entered the market without a licence. 
Today, the basic operational framework of private television media is defined by Law 2328/1995, in 
essence the first serious attempt to regulate the commercial broadcasting market effectively. The 
commercial stations are obliged to provide programmes of high quality, objective information and 
news reports, and to promote cultural diversity. The NCRTV has the authority to request information 
from radio and TV stations concerning their organization and financing. Law 2644/1998 made 
provision for the supply of broadcasting subscription services, and regulated all new pay-TV services 
regardless of their process (digital or analogue) and means of broadcast (terrestrial, cable or satellite).  
Law 3592/2007, titled ‘New Act on Concentration and Licensing of Media Undertakings’, was 
passed by the Greek Parliament in late 2007. This Law provided for a number of issues, among them 
licensing for analogue TV, DTT and media concentration. More specifically, the text made a provision 
for the licensing procedure for analogue television since, as indicated above, in Greece most radio and 
TV stations did not hold such a licence. The granting of licences would be based on a tender initiated 
by the NCRTV. Candidates would be classified based on the following criteria: duration of service; 
economic viability; number of employees; programming; negative marking; and merging. 
Moreover, Law 3592/2007,dealt with the issue of digital television, independently of platform such 
as terrestrial, satellite, cable or IPTV, and made a clear distinction between platform, or multiplex 
(network) operator, and content provider. The platform or multiplex operator was placed under a 
general licence regime, provided that the undertaking/company was registered by the Hellenic 
Telecommunications and Post Commission (EETT). The law allowed licensed TV stations to digitally 
transmit their analogue TV programming using frequencies that were to be allocated for the period up 
to digital switchover. In effect, commercial analogue TV broadcasters were encouraged to collaborate 
with public broadcaster ERT in forming a single multiplex operator company that would act as the 
network operator for the whole DTT platform. As Papathanassopoulos and Negrine (2010) mentioned, 
the venture was politicized. One of the main points of contention for opposition parties for this new 
ERT’s digital subsidiary was that in this way ERT Digital would be a mixed public-private company, 
with the state retaining a 51 per cent stake. The opposition parties charged that this signaled the 
gradual beginning of the end of the public nature of ERT since private investors would participate in 
its capital. 
Finally, the Law also dealt with media concentration and attempted to update the strict ownership 
rules passed with Law 2328/1995. This strict regulatory framework had not prevented high levels of 
concentration of media ownership, as evidenced by the control of electronic media (particularly 
MEGA) by powerful publishing interests. In light of various changes in proprietary issues, the new 
law attempted to address, albeit unsuccessfully, the dominance of the private broadcasters, by 
simplifying and liberalizing rules. As the law was never fully implemented, a large number of 
important issues, such as TV channel licensing, media market concentration and the development of 
digital television remained unresolved. But even when legislation was existent media owners tended to 
ignore it. In this largely unregulated media environment, dominated by private interests, the political 
elite took an unprecedented decision to cease the operation of ERT. It is to this issue we are now 
turning our attention. More specifically, the next section considers the Greek Council of State’s 
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suspension decision while the final one deals with the legality of ERT’s closure under EU and ECHR 
Law.  
The Greek Council of State’s suspension decision 
The abrupt closure of the Greek PSB has been widely condemned by international, European and 
national organizations, including the Council of Europe, the Organization for Security and Co-
operation in Europe (OSCE), the European Parliament and media organizations (Economou, 2013).
2
 
The European Broadcasting Union (EBU), the professional association of European PSBs of which 
ERT is a founding member, urged the Greek Prime Minister, Antonis Samaras, to immediately reverse 
the decision in question and to re-establish ERT’s broadcasting service.3 Given that this 
recommendation was not acted upon, the EBU took the unprecedented step of putting the Greek 
broadcaster’s news coverage - previously only available via a live stream on the EBU website - back 
on air via the EBU’s Athens earth station. These news programmes were being produced at ERT’s 
Thessaloniki studios in defiance of the Government’s order to cease operations. 
The first legal breakthrough in the ERT saga came, however, with a suspension decision by the 
Greek Council of State, Greece’s supreme administrative court, of 17 June 2013, following a 
suspension petition by the trade union of ERT employees (POSPERT).
4
 The temporary injunction by 
the President of the Council of State ordered the suspension of the co-ministerial decision of 11 June 
2013 exclusively with regard to the termination of the transmission of radio and television 
broadcasting, of the publishing, the operation of websites and of any other operation of ERT, as well 
as of all its frequencies until a new PSB is established. Moreover, the court ordered that it is for ‘the 
competent Minister of Finance, the Deputy Minister assigned to the Prime Minister and the special 
liquidator to adopt all necessary organizational measures, including the hiring of the necessary 
personnel for the broadcasting by an interim public organization as soon as possible of the necessary 
radio and television programs and the operation of websites, until the establishment and operation of a 
new public broadcasting organization which will be serving the public interest…’.5 
It is significant that the Council of State left all the other aspects of the co-ministerial decision 
untouched, i.e. the abolition of ERT and of its subsidiaries, the transfer of all of its assets and liabilities 
to the state, the termination of all work contracts and of the management’s term of office and the 
suspension of the licence fee collection. The decision did not explicitly state that the PSB that would 
be entrusted with the re-establishment of the signal and websites would be a body different from ERT. 
Nonetheless, the fact that ERT’s abolition was left intact pointed in this direction. Any remaining 
doubts in this regard were dispelled by the decision of 19 June 2013, which modified the initial co-
ministerial decision, allegedly in compliance with the Council of State’s decree, and assigned the 
reinstatement of the broadcasting service to the special liquidator for ERT’s estate, its hitherto general 
manager.
6
 
The legal reasoning to the suspension decision was provided three days later by way of a decision 
of the Suspension Committee of the Council of State.
7
 The legal basis for the suspension decision is 
                                                     
2
 See EJC, ‘The EJC appeals to Greek prime minister on behalf of Greek public broadcaster, ERT’, 19 June 2013, 
www.ejc.net/projects/news/article/the-ejc-appeals-to-greek-prime-minister-on-behalf-of-greek-public-broadcast, 15 July 
2013.  
3
 EBU, ‘Open letter to Greek Prime Minister, Antonis Samaras’, 11 June 2013, 
www3.ebu.ch/files/live/sites/ebu/files/Frontpage%20News/2013/06/20130612_AS_pmletter.pdf, accessed 15 July 2013.  
 
5
 ΣτΕ 236/2013, para. 12.  
6
 Decision 5/19.6.2013, ‘Modification of the joint ministerial decision 02/11.6.2013’(B’ 1483/19.6.2013).  
7
 Suspension Decision 236/2013 of the Suspension Committee of the Council of State (hereinafter referred to as ‘ΣτΕ 
236/2013’) as translated into English by the European Broadcasting Union, ‘A closer look at the ERT decision’, 21 June 
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Art. 52 (6) of the Presidential Decree 18/1989, which provides that suspension of the challenged 
administrative act can only be granted if, as a result of enforcement, the complainant may suffer 
damage, which is irreparable or may only be redressed with difficulty if the Act is eventually annulled. 
The applicants had argued that the ministerial decision in question lacked legal basis and justification, 
violated ERT’s right to be heard and was contrary to principles of the Greek Constitution and 
fundamental rights guaranteed by EU and international conventions such as: the principle of 
uninterrupted operation of a public broadcasting organisation and the principle of proportionality as 
safeguarded by Art. 15 (2) and Art. 25 (1) of the Greek Constitution respectively; Art. 11 of the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU; the Amsterdam Protocol on public broadcasting and Art.10 
of the European Convention on Human Rights. 
The Suspension Committee found that the reasons brought forward by the applicants did not 
‘appear as substantiated and therefore they cannot justify the granting of the suspension of 
enforcement of the ministerial decision in question.’8 It needs to be stressed that this is merely a 
rejection of the suspension petition, not a judgement on the legality of the co-ministerial decision. .  
The Suspension Committee held, firstly, that the ministerial decision was correctly based on Art. 
14B (1) of Law 3429/2005. This provision states that the Minister of Finance and the competent 
Minister may, by a joint decision, abolish ERT – along with certain other public companies and 
organizations (DEKO) - if it burdens the State budget directly or indirectly or if it has a similar 
purpose or so as to restructure its operational costs. The avowed objective of the co-ministerial 
decision was to ‘restructure the operation and the organizational cost of the public broadcasting and 
television services through the establishment of a new organization, serving the mandates of the 
Constitution, the democratic, social and cultural needs of society as well as the need to insure 
polyphony in public media.’9 This broadly framed objective is problematic given that Art. 14B of Law 
3429/2005 allows the abolition of ERT on fiscal policy considerations only, but not so as to generally 
improve its operation by replacing it with a body better able to fulfil its public service mission. The 
abolition of a public body, established by law, with the purpose of its replacement by another, more 
efficient one would require a legal basis, not a simple ministerial decision (Kaidatzis, 2013: 157).
10
 
Nonetheless, the fact that, in the Suspension Committee’s view, the ministerial decision was based on 
a sound legal basis and pursued public interest objectives, led it to conclude that the granting of a 
suspension was not justified notwithstanding the moral and financial damage suffered by the 
applicants.  
Having rejected the suspension of ERT’s closure, the Suspension Committee turned its attention to 
the termination of the transmission of ERT’s radio and television broadcasting, its publishing activities 
and the operation of its internet sites as well as the inactivity of its frequencies. It held that the turning 
off of all ERT activity caused irreparable damage in view of the special role provided by law for the 
public radio and television, also protected by Art. 15 (2) of the Greek Constitution. Furthermore, it 
considered that the administrative law principle of ‘continuity of public service’ also dictated the 
continuing operation of ERT’s services. Consequently, the Suspension Committee’s overall verdict 
was that the co-ministerial decision should be suspended only in so far as it provided the stopping of 
radio, TV and internet services and the deactivation of ERT frequencies, but left unscathed with regard 
to ERT’s closure.  
(Contd.)                                                                  
2013, www3.ebu.ch/cms/en/sites/ebu/contents/knowledge/media-law/Latest/a-closer-look-at-the-ert-decisio.html, 
accessed 18 July 2013.  
8
 Ibid., para. 9.  
9
 Joint ministerial decision 02/11.6.2013 ‘Dissolution of the public company “Hellenic Radio- Television SocieteAnonyme 
(ERTS.A)”’ (B’ 1414/11.6.2013).  
10
 contra I. Karakostas, ‘I nea dimosia - kai ochi kratiki – radiotileorasi’, 16 July 2013, www.kathimerini.gr, accessed 17 
July 2013. 
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The Council of State’s interim judgment is laudable in so far as it emphasized the important 
societal role performed by public service broadcasting (PSB) and said a resounding no to the 
interruption of its provision in Greece. However, it is deeply unsatisfactory as it created an artificial 
dichotomy between ERT – the sole PSB provider in Greece – and the institution of PSB as such. The 
lacuna left by ERT’s elimination was especially problematic in view of the fact that ERT had been the 
sole legal audiovisual operator in Greece. Private broadcasters –with the exception of radio stations in 
Attica – operate without licences despite numerous castigations of this unconstitutional state of affairs 
by the Council of State (Psychogiopoulou et al., 2011: 11).
11
 Having wiped out ERT, how could PSB 
resume its operation without further ado? 
The Suspension Committee ordered that its decision be complied with as soon as possible, but left 
many questions unanswered as to how this could happen. First, it is curious that the special liquidator, 
who was only entrusted by law with the sale of ERT’s assets, also had the power to set up the interim 
body that was to replace ERT.
12
 Secondly, the establishment of a PSB organization, even if it is only 
an interim one, needs to be based on a law, which safeguards its independence from the state. 
However, the adoption of the legal and organizational steps that were required for the institution of the 
new provisional entity were inevitably time-consuming and not conducive to a speedy implementation 
of the Council of State’s ruling. 
Indeed, more than three weeks passed before the Council of State’s decision was implemented. The 
new interim body with the initial name ‘Hellenic Public Television’ (Elliniki Dimosia Tileorasi, EDT), 
later to be changed to ‘Public Television’ (Dimosia Tileorasi, DT), that was launched on 10 July 2013, 
had none of the abovementioned legal safeguards of independence. Its unlicensed operation initially 
consisted in the broadcast of movies, series and documentaries. This bare-bone service was then 
supplemented by a news programme, and the new DT website ‘hprt.gr’ also became operational. The 
‘first programme’ of ‘Greek Public Radio’ started broadcasting on 26 September 2013. DT initially 
broadcast from private studios given that the ERT headquarters were under siege from its 
approximately 2,700 dismissed employees. On 7 November 2013, a pre-dawn police operation 
evacuated the ERT headquarters, which were then assigned to DT. The transitional service has been 
fiercely criticised by the laid-off ERT employees and the Greek social media as ‘illegal, dictatorial and 
unconstitutional’, a ‘pirate construct’ and an ‘imitation of ERT’.13 It is perhaps ironic that the 
government announced 2,000 positions for the new broadcasting service, far exceeding the originally 
promised halving of the PSB’s size. Initially, only 580 employees were hired for the running of DT on 
two-month contracts, while the remaining staff would be appointed when the stalemate with the 
dismissed employees had been resolved. Indeed, a large percentage of the former ERT staff was 
reappointed by DT. 
The ruling coalition of the New Democracy and Pasok parties also passed a bill for the 
establishment of NERIT by a narrow majority of 155 votes in the 300-seat house. The bill was closely 
modelled after a draft bill for the re-organization of ERT drawn up in February 2012 by a committee 
of independent experts presided over by Nikolaos Alivizatos, Professor of Constitutional Law at the 
University of Athens. The committee was initially formed in October 2011 by the then Minister of 
State, Elias Mosialos, with the aim of strengthening ERT’s independence from government and 
political parties and of revamping ERT’s administrative structure so as to render it more efficient 
(Papaioannou, 2012). The Mosialos plan of August 2011 envisioned inter alia the closure of some of 
the ERT television and radio channels including ET1 -the oldest ERT television station- and the 
reduction of ERT employees’ numbers (Economou, 2011). However, these proposals foundered on the 
vehement opposition of the Greek political parties and POSPERT.  
                                                     
11
 ΣτΕ 3578/2010; ΣτΕ 996/2013.  
12
 Decision 3/12.6.2013, ‘Modification of the joint ministerial decision 02/11.6.2013’(B’ 1423/12.6.2013).  
13
 M. Arkouli, ‘ERT Reporters call EDT Pirate Construct’, 10 July 2013, www.greece.greekreporter.com, accessed 22 July 
2013. 
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The new NERIT law displays, however, some crucial differences from the Alivizatos bill. In its 
transitional provisions, it allows an alternative procedure for the first time appointment of the 
broadcaster’s Supervisory Council, which is entrusted with the selection of the broadcaster’s 
Chairman and Administrative Board. The ordinary procedure for the selection of the Supervisory 
Council’s members requires the involvement of specialized personnel recruitment agencies and of a 
higher education institution.
14
 The transitional procedure, however, allows a temporary Supervisory 
Council to be set up by the Ministerial Council on the instructions of the Minister of State and the 
Deputy Minister responsible for public television.
15
 The temporary Council’s term of office is not to 
exceed one year. Professor Alivizatos expressed doubts about the constitutionality of the transitional 
provisions. He argued that the temporary Supervisory Council should not have the power to select 
personnel and should not remain in office for more than four months.
16
 Indeed, a government 
orchestrated appointment of NERIT’s key personnel would undermine the effort to enhance the 
nascent broadcaster’s future independence. 
Unfortunately, this is not the only factor that bodes ill for the independence of NERIT, which 
recently launched its first programme. The ill thought-out ambush on ERT that was perpetrated on the 
night of 11 June 2013 has been at the same time a direct attack on the institution of PSB. How is it 
possible to create a well-run, independent PSB when the shadow of government intervention without 
prior democratic debate in Parliament looms large? Admittedly, ERT has been suffering from 
maladministration, state dependency and a low audience share. However, it has also been suffering 
from lack of funds with its licence fee, levied on electricity bills, one of the lowest in Europe.
17
 Yet, 
ERT has also been accused of wastefulness. Its closure with immediate effect at the whim of two 
government ministers, intended to appease Greece’s international moneylenders, has left Greece more 
impoverished than ever. Placing a long-standing cultural institution on the Procrustean bed is not the 
way to overcome the financial crisis. What is most needed are social cohesion and a broad public 
consent. Yet, ERT’s closure has left Greece more divided than ever. The two parallel ERT and EDT 
services, both accusing each other as ‘rogue’, constituted a vivid symbol of this division. 
In the meantime, EBU decided that the time was ripe for its principles to give way to pragmatism. 
It therefore interrupted the transmission of the ERT ex-employees’ programme via its satellites and 
website. Furthermore, it promised to the Greek government to put its know-how at NERIT’s, the ERT 
successor’s, service. The reaction was imminent as EBU‘s pronouncements sparked off a solidarity 
campaign for ERT. Remarkably, at the time of writing, around 700 unpaid former ERT employees still 
continue providing programmes around the clock, which are accessible via various websites but also 
short waves, satellite, and in Western Greece through the analogue signal.
18
 The online ERT 
programme attracts significant numbers of viewers and listeners and has been characterized as ‘a 
unique experiment in the history of public service media in Europe.’19 
Perhaps the only credible way out of this stalemate could have been found in Councillor 
Karamanof’s dissenting opinion to the Council of State’s verdict. In her view, the abolishment of ERT 
without the establishment of a new, equivalent organization would most probably cause the loss of 
ERT’s rights and obligations and an irreparable damage to the applicants. Therefore the dissenting 
judge concluded that the enforcement of the entire decision had to be suspended. In other words, not 
only the interruption of ERT’s service, but also its closure should have been rolled back. Even though 
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 NERIT Law, Art. 8.  
15
 Ibid., Art. 16.  
16
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framed along the narrow lines of a suspension petition, this dissenting opinion proposed a viable 
solution: the provisional re-establishment of the status quo ante. Regrettably, neither the majority of 
the Council of State nor the Government concurred with this view. . The plenary session of the 
Council of State recently spoke its final word on the legality of ERT’s closure. In its decision of 10 
June 2014, it held that ERT’s closure was in conformity with the Greek Constitution, which did not 
guarantee the operation of PSB.
20
 Nor were such guarantees provided by the ECHR as long as quality 
of programming and pluralism were safeguarded otherwise. The Council of State maintained that this 
was the case in view of the large number of private TV and radio stations operating in Greece. 
However, this was not a unanimous verdict, with a minority of ten councillors arguing that ERT’s 
closure was unconstitutional, especially in view of the illegal operation of private broadcasters in 
Greece to date. The following section will be devoted to the examination of the legality of ERT’s 
closure, first, from an EU and, secondly, from an ECHR perspective.  
The legality of ERT’s closure under EU and ECHR Law 
Having examined the Council of State’s findings as to the legality of ERT’s shutdown , this section 
will consider the same question under the lens of, first, EU Law, and secondly, the European 
Convention of Human Rights (ECHR). Does EU Law or the ECHR offer any guarantees that militate 
against the closure, or substantial diminution for that matter, of a PSB? 
The Legality of ERT’s closure under EU Law 
Even though PSB is not explicitly mentioned in the Treaties, the European Union has considerably 
influenced its development. The 1997 Amsterdam Protocol recognizes the importance of PSB for the 
democratic, social and cultural needs of each society and for media pluralism. Together with the 
largely symbolic Article 16 EC that was also inserted by the Treaty of Amsterdam (now Article 14 of 
the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU)), it demonstrates an increased awareness 
of the importance of services of general economic interest in the European Union, without, however, 
dictating the existence of a dual broadcasting system or proscribing the shutdown of a PSB. At the 
same time, the Amsterdam Protocol makes abundantly clear that PSB funding will be closely 
scrutinized to ensure that it will ‘not affect trading conditions and competition in the Community to an 
extent which would be contrary to the common interest’. The EU’s main activity in this area has hence 
served to police national PSB systems and their expansion in the digital domain by means of the state 
aid law instruments at its disposal as these have been fleshed out in the 2001 and 2009 Broadcasting 
Communications.
21
 
A certain shift from the EU’s purely competition-based approach to PSB can be observed in the 
context of initiatives that have been taken since 2007 under the banner of ‘media pluralism’ and later 
on ‘media freedom and pluralism’. Traditionally, the European Parliament has been the EU institution 
that has been most active in bringing the issue of media pluralism in the limelight and in urging the 
Commission to act in this direction. The European Commission for its part had since its 1992 Green 
Paper on Pluralism and Media Concentration in the Internal Market taken the stance that protecting 
pluralism as such was principally a matter for the Member States. There would only be need for 
Community action if national measures aimed at safeguarding pluralism impacted upon the smooth 
functioning of the internal market.
22
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However, more recently, the Commission has started taking a more proactive part on media 
pluralism. In 2007, it issued a Staff Working Paper on Media Pluralism in which it recognized the 
importance of both public service and commercial broadcasters for media pluralism and noted the 
pressures on the former as regards their editorial independence, recruitment of staff and funding, 
especially in some of the new EU Member States.
23
 The Commission still held – on the basis of the 
results of various consultations undertaken in the past- that it would be inappropriate to submit a 
legislative initiative on pluralism, but undertook to closely monitor the situation by means of relevant 
indicators that would be identified by an independent study. The said study was launched by DG 
INFSO and was completed in 2009. In this context, it recognized that public service media are a 
cornerstone of democracy and identified as one of the main threats to them from a legal/regulatory 
perspective the absence or insufficiency of their funding.
24
 The report also noted the risks for political 
pluralism due to the political dependence of public service media. It identified the appointment and 
composition of their governing bodies, the mechanisms of financing and those for the appointment and 
dismissal of key personnel as relevant indicators. It was originally intended that the study would be 
followed by a Commission Communication. However, such Communication was never adopted, and 
four more years passed before the Commission entrusted the EUI Centre for Media Pluralism and 
Media Freedom with a pilot implementation of the Media Monitor in September 2013 (Barzanti, 2012: 
21; Brogi and Parcu, 2014: 6). While these initiatives bear testimony to the threats to pluralism as a 
result of the underfunding of PSB, the political interference with its operation and the insufficient 
access to it, they do not address the case of its total eclipse nor do they offer any avenues for redress.  
Meanwhile, the appointment of Commissioner and Vice-President Neelie Croes brought with it a 
strategic reorientation in this area. In 2011, a High Level Group of experts on Media Freedom and 
Pluralism was appointed with the mandate of drawing up a report with recommendations for the 
respect, protection, support and promotion of pluralism and freedom of the media in Europe. The first 
recommendation that the High Level Group put forward has been that ‘The EU should be considered 
competent to act to protect media freedom and pluralism at State level in order to guarantee the 
substance of the rights granted by the Treaties to EU citizens, in particular the rights of free movement 
and to representative democracy’.25 In particular, the High Level Group argued that certain national 
policies that restrict media freedom and pluralism are also likely to hinder the free movement of media 
companies or journalists to those Member States. Relying on the judgement of the Court of Justice of 
the European Union (CJEU) in Case C-34/09, Zambrano, the High Level Group argued that ‘a case of 
systematic restriction of media freedom and pluralism in a Member State must be considered as 
having “the effect of depriving citizens of the Union of the genuine enjoyment of the substance of the 
rights conferred by virtue of their status as citizens of the Union”.’26 Moreover, the argument was put 
forward that restrictions on media freedom and pluralism at EU level would affect the EU democratic 
process by depriving EU citizens of their right to form informed opinions and thus to meaningfully 
participate in the European Parliament and local elections.  
The link drawn between media freedom and EU citizenship seems to have been inspired by an 
article by von Bogdandy et al (2012: 489), which was published in the Common Market Law Review 
in 2012, and which was the fruit of a larger study on media freedom in Europe for the German Federal 
Foreign Office. The authors of the said article observed that the Court in Zambrano conceptualized EU 
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citizenship not merely as transnational citizenship, enabling its holders to move freely without 
suffering discrimination, but as a broader ‘fundamental status’ protecting EU citizens also in the 
absence of any cross-border element against ‘excesses even of their Member States of origin which 
would deprive that status of practical meaning’ (von Bogdandy et al, 2012: 505). Indeed, the 
Zambrano case revolved around the question whether the refusal to grant a right of residence and work 
permit to the non-EU parent of dependent minor children of Belgian nationality, who were born in 
Belgium and had never left that Member State, deprived them of the substance of their rights as EU 
citizens by forcing them to leave the EU to accompany their parents. The Court answered this question 
in the affirmative. The authors of the abovementioned article argued that this notion of EU citizenship 
as a ‘fundamental status’ would be incomplete if it remained separated from fundamental rights 
questions. They held that the connection between the two was particularly obvious and compelling as 
regards media freedom, which is quintessential for EU citizens’ rights to democratic participation. 
However, the linkage of EU citizenship with fundamental rights is contentious. It has been argued 
that there should be a careful separation between the two lest the CJEU jurisdiction be indefinitely 
expanded and the CJEU become a second human rights court (Jacobs, 2010, 133).
27
 Indeed, a general 
fundamental rights review of Member State action would be incompatible with Article 51 (1) of the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (CFREU), which limits the Charter’s scope of 
application to ‘the institutions, bodies, offices and agencies of the Union with due regard for the 
principle of subsidiarity and to the Member States only when they are implementing Union law.’  
So as to counter these objections, von Bogdandi et al qualified their thesis in two important 
respects. First, they posited that a domestic human rights violation outside the boundaries of Article 51 
(1) CFREU would only fall under the scope of Union law if it infringed the essence of fundamental 
rights.
28
 Such a violation of the essence of media freedom is conceivable in their view if political 
speech or debate on questions of public interest is stifled, e.g. in the case of a ‘blanket ban’ on certain 
media. Secondly, von Bogdandi et al consider that on subsidiarity grounds there should be a 
presumption of respect of fundamental rights at national level in the fields that are autonomous from 
EU law. Consequently, EU citizens could only rely on their status to invoke a violation of their 
fundamental rights if they succeeded in rebutting this presumption. The authors named this second 
requirement ‘reverse Solange’ after the German Constitutional Court (BVerfG)’s famous Solange II 
decision.
29
 In this decision, the BVerfG maintained that it would no longer exercise its jurisdiction to 
control secondary EC law as long as the EC generally ensured an effective protection of fundamental 
rights that was substantially similar to that under the German Constitution. In a reversal of this 
doctrine, von Bogdandi et al suggest that the EU should not control the compatibility of national law 
with fundamental rights outside the scope of the CFREU so long as Member States generally ensure 
an effective standard of protection at national level. This presumption of compliance could not be 
rebutted by ‘simple and isolated fundamental rights infringements’ but by ‘violations of the essence of 
fundamental rights which in number or seriousness account for systemic failure and are not remedied 
by an adequate response within the respective national system’ (von Bogdandy et al, 2012: 513).30 
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This raises the question whether the closure of ERT constitutes such a violation of the essence of 
fundamental rights that would allow a claim on the basis of EU Citizenship to be made.
31
 In other 
words, has ERT’s closure deprived EU citizens living in Greece (but also diaspora Greeks and other 
Greek speaking EU citizens) of their right to a free, open and pluralist political space and thus 
compromised their participation in the EU democratic process? The arbitrary and irrational closure of 
the Greek PSB, which took place without any previous public dialogue and consultation, constituted a 
seismic event of such proportions that arguably met the high threshold for EU intervention as 
envisaged by the High Level Group. In the one month period between ERT’s shutdown and the 
commencing of broadcasts by EDT, the Greek nation was deprived of the only legal TV operator they 
have ever possessed as well as of their only source of public service information. The government’s 
authoritarian move resulted in a blow to Greek democracy by sacrificing ERT’s legacy under the 
pretence of financial expediency. It also dealt a blow to the European democratic process by degrading 
PSB as an institution.  
However, ERT has in the meantime been succeeded by NERIT. It has already been noted that the 
genesis of this body as well as the legal framework in which it operates render its independence 
questionable. If this is the case, the fundamental rights infringement that was originally committed 
with ERT’s shutdown would be perpetuated and aggravated as a result of the gradual consolidation of 
the position of the new PSB. However, this conclusion cannot be reached frivolously, out of a 
sentimental attachment to ERT, but needs to be underpinned with facts. More precisely, it would be 
necessary to prove that the audiovisual landscape in Greece in the post-ERT era suffers from a 
pluralism deficit. This would be the case if NERIT was found to lack the necessary independence 
against political or economic interference or failed to provide an impartial and comprehensive 
programme diet comprising information, education, culture and entertainment.
32
 The fact that this 
body carries the stigma of its undemocratic birth calls for extreme caution when conducting this 
assessment. More than that, it increases the likelihood that its independence is curtailed, justifying a 
reversal of the presumption stipulated by von Bogdandy et al. If the lack of independence of the new 
PSB structure is confirmed, EU Citizenship could provide a mechanism that is enforceable in the 
Greek legal order so as to protect pluralism and freedom of expression. If the new public television is, 
however, found to be well-functioning, independent and accountable, it would be inappropriate for the 
EU to intervene. The regrettable path that Greece as a sovereign state has taken so as to restore the 
much needed operation of public service media would then have to be respected. 
Also, it is worth considering whether the CFREU itself could come into play to pass a verdict on 
the legality of ERT’s closure. Article 11 CFREU goes further than Art. 10 ECHR by explicitly 
pronouncing in its second paragraph that ‘The freedom and pluralism of the media shall be respected’. 
The level of protection of freedom of expression under the Charter must be at least equivalent to and 
may even exceed that provided under the ECHR.
33
 Crucially, for the strength of protection under Art. 
11 CFREU to be tested before the CJEU, the closure of ERT would need to fall within the scope of the 
Charter. In accordance with Art. 51 (1) CFREU, this would be the case if Greece was implementing 
Union law.
34
 One aspect of ERT’s closure with an EU Law dimension was the deactivation of ERT 
(Contd.)                                                                  
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frequencies as this had been ordered by the Greek Government.
35
 The use of radio frequencies comes 
under the Authorization Directive, so that withdrawal of the authorization would need to have been 
objective, transparent, proportionate and non-discriminatory.
36
 These criteria were arguably not 
fulfilled and, as has been noted above, the Council of State’s interim judgement ordered that ERT 
frequencies had to be restored with immediate effect.  
A further question that is worth asking is whether the overall shutdown of ERT took place in 
implementation of Union law. One of the reasons adduced by the Greek Government for ERT’s 
closure was the need to lay off public employees so as to comply with the austerity demands of the 
‘troika’, i.e. the European Commission, the European Central Bank and the International Monetary 
Fund, and qualify for the next loan tranche. Does this mean that Greece acted in implementation of 
Union law? The European Commission did not dispute that ERT’s closure was a reaction to the 
exigencies of the current economic climate. It held that ‘[T]he decision of the Greek authorities should 
be seen in the context of the major and necessary efforts that the authorities are taking to modernize 
the Greek economy.’37 At the same time, the Commission washed its hands of responsibility by saying 
that the Greek authorities took the decision to close down ERT ‘in full autonomy’. Even though the 
‘troika’ had never demanded the actual closure of ERT, its substantial downsizing was part of the 
European Commission’s Adjustment Program for Greece.38 Greece exceeded, however, the 
Commission’s expectations. Its sudden move to shut down ERT was not designed as a reform 
measure. The shutdown of a broadcaster that had been running a surplus budget for a number of years 
took the Coalition partners and even the responsible Secretary of State by surprise. The notion is 
therefore hard to discard that an important motive for ERT’s closure was the wish to reap political 
credit by showing resolve to implement a tough reform agenda.
39
 The argument that Greece acted 
strictly in implementation of EU law appears therefore precipitate. 
The Legality of ERT’s closure under the ECHR 
In considering whether ERT’s closure violated Art. 10 ECHR, it is necessary to note at the outset that 
the protection afforded to PSBs under the Convention is subsidiary to that afforded to them under their 
domestic legal systems.
40
 Not only do applicants need to exhaust national remedies as a matter of 
procedure before applying to the European Court of Human Rights, they might also enjoy a higher 
level of protection at national level if their domestic legal system guarantees their existence and 
development; as is the case under German constitutional law for example. In Germany, the 
Grundversorgung doctrine, which entrusts PSBs with the mission of ensuring the essential basic 
provision for all, guarantees, first, the maintenance of existing public service programmes, and, 
secondly, their development in view of rapid technological change.
41
 Greek constitutional law does not 
offer similar guarantees to PSBs. The principle of ‘continuity of public service’, which is part of Greek 
administrative law, is less far-reaching, but goes in the same direction. The Convention for its part 
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does not contain an existence guarantee for PSBs (Berka and Tretter, 2013). Nor does it mandate a 
dual broadcasting system or oblige Member States to establish a PSB if they have not yet done so, 
unless if private broadcasters are too weak to offer a pluralistic system.
42
 This does not, however, 
mean that the closure of an existing PSB could not fall to be scrutinized under ECHR law.  
In order for the closure of ERT to violate Art. 10 ECHR, it would be necessary to establish that 
there has been an interference with freedom of expression, first, of the employees working at ERT 
who had a right to impart information and ideas and, secondly, of the viewing public who had a right 
to receive the ERT programmes. As has been astutely observed by the Committee of Ministers, threats 
to the continuity of the activities of PSBs, not least due to uncertainty of short- and longer-term 
funding, directly translate into threats to their editorial independence and institutional autonomy.
43
 
This has to apply even more so to the complete stopping of the ERT services and the deactivation of 
its frequencies, which made such threats a reality and thus gravely interfered with the right to freedom 
of expression.
44
 
Next, it is necessary to consider whether this interference was justified under Art. 10 (2) ECHR. 
This would be the case if the interference was prescribed by law, if it was carried out in pursuance of 
one of the objectives listed in Art. 10 (2) ECHR and if it was necessary in a democratic society. As we 
have seen above, the ERT closure took place on the basis of Art. 14B of Law 3429/2005, which 
allowed the abolition of ERT on fiscal policy considerations only, namely if it burdened the State 
budget directly or indirectly or if it had a similar purpose or so as to restructure its operational costs. It 
is doubtful whether the closure could have been based on this provision given that ERT was a 
profitable undertaking. In any event, as the Court noted in the Di Stefano case, ‘the expression 
“prescribed by law” in the second paragraph of Article 10 not only requires that the impugned measure 
should have a legal basis in domestic law, but also refers to the quality of the law in question, which 
should be accessible to the person concerned and foreseeable as to its effects.’45 It is equally doubtful 
whether the ERT management and employees could have foreseen the possibility of an ERT shutdown 
on the basis of this provision.  
Identifying a legitimate objective under Art. 10 (2) ECHR on the basis of which the shutdown of 
ERT could have been carried out is even harder. The closure of a PSB on the basis of purely financial 
considerations is in any case not allowed under Art. 10 (2) ECHR. The only legitimate objective that 
could come into question is the protection of rights of others. This provision has been interpreted 
expansively by the Court to also include the protection of pluralism and democracy.
46
 As we have 
seen, the co-ministerial decision pursued inter alia the objective of replacing ERT with a new 
organization that would better serve the needs of pluralism in public service media. However, this 
objective could not have been legitimately pursued under the chosen legal basis, Art. 14B of Law 
3429/2005. 
Moreover, it is not clear how the shutdown of ERT could have contributed to pluralism, especially 
given that ERT was the only broadcaster with a legal obligation to provide objective, unbiased news. It 
has been argued that ERT’s closure would need to be seen in the context of the ‘media landscape as a 
whole, including print media as well as other broadcasters’ (Berka and Tretter, 2013: 25). In other 
words, the contribution of ERT to plurality as well as the level of plurality after the closure would 
need to be assessed, also taking the existence of the new interim body into account. As already noted 
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earlier, it is very unlikely that the new public broadcaster serves the demands of pluralism better than 
the silenced ERT with its long cultural legacy. Greece’s drop by 14 places to the 99th place out of 180 
countries, just one place before Bulgaria, the lowest ranked EU country, in this year’s World Press 
Freedom Index is an unmistakable sign that media freedom and pluralism in Greece have deteriorated 
since ERT’s closure, which was characterized in the report as ‘a turning point in Greece’s media 
history’.47 Moreover, statistics show that Greek TV channels, and especially DT, devote a 
disproportionate amount of airtime to the ruling Nea Dimokratia party to the detriment of other 
political parties.
48
 The National Council for Radio and Television (NCRTV), Greece’s independent 
broadcasting authority, recently issued a recommendation, stressing the need for all news and 
information programmes to respect pluralism and to represent the views of all legal political parties.
49
 
Finally the proportionality of the assault against ERT is also very doubtful. First of all, the 
appropriateness of this measure is questionable. If the aim of the measure was to reduce Greece’s 
budget deficit, it was wholly unsuitable to achieve this aim. Firstly, ERT was a profitable company. 
Secondly, ERT’s closure would not have relieved but burdened the state budget further if 
compensation for ERT’s unfulfilled contracts had been paid out.50 Thirdly, as has already been noted, 
the alleged objective of slimming down public service media in Greece has probably not materialized 
given that a big percentage of ERT’s ex-employees have been reappointed by NERIT. If the aim 
pursued by ERT’s shutdown was to replace it with a PSB that could better serve the needs of society, 
this has to be seen as no more than a lofty aspiration to which the abovementioned reservations about 
DT and NERIT apply.  
The second step of the proportionality assessment, the necessity of ERT’s closure, is not satisfied 
either.
51
 ERT’s shutdown was an unpremeditated move that took place without prior consultation. 
ERT could have gradually been restructured had PSB reform not been an untouchable topic in Greek 
politics in the past. If the government’s intention was to clean the ‘Augean stables’ in a single day, 
then surely this could have better been achieved by opening the stables’ doors to the waves of reform 
than by knocking the entire edifice down.  
Conclusion  
Since the late 1980s the Greek media system has been transformed by the entry of big industrial and 
merchant capital into the media scene and the ‘savage deregulation’ of broadcasting. This impacted 
greatly on public broadcaster ERT who never recovered from huge losses of audience share and 
advertising income. Despite the plethora of commercial channels entering the market, a major problem 
relating to media concentration has emerged. In most cases important media companies followed 
diversification strategies. They extended their activities in different sectors of the industry, and there 
were also a number of general conglomerates that incorporated media outlets in wider economic 
empires. Today, just a few leading players dominate the scene and account for about 70 per cent of the 
television market. Regulatory responses to the problems of unlicensed channels as well as to growing 
concerns over rising media concentration were contradictory and ineffective. On the one hand, the law 
which abolished state monopoly in television gave priority to existing media companies in granting a 
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licence and, more important, the National Council for Radio and Television failed to establish 
enforceable licensing and contact rules. Even when legislation was existent, media owners tended to 
ignore it.  
In this environment one would have expected the political elite to strengthen the role of PSB as a 
guarantor of pluralism and diversity; instead, the government decided to close ERT down. After going 
through the shortcomings of the Greek broadcasting landscape (de-facto TV deregulation with no 
consideration as to the effects on market structure; inefficient regulatory framework; etc.), this paper 
presented ‘the ERT story’ and referred to the specific events leading to the shutting down of the Greek 
PSB. As mentioned above, this move was part of the latest public spending cuts imposed to meet the 
terms of the country’s bailout deal. The new body to replace ERT was actually established in autumn 
2013, after having left the country without a PSB service for a long time. 
Was the government right in closing down ERT? The short answer is no! This paper contended that 
ERT’s role as an impartial PSB is important especially today given the growth in social tension and 
the rise of the far rightin Greece. It is not acceptable to close down a PSB without consultation and to 
dismiss its employees, just to justify the wishes of the ‘troika’ for redundancies in the public sector. 
We have argued in this paper that the nexus between media freedom and EU Citizenship could provide 
a fruitful avenue to challenge ERT’s closure. The examination from an ECHR prism also found the 
intentions behind and the processes leading to ERT’s unravelling deficient.  
The closure of ERT is an attack on free speech and public space by the Greek government. Without 
doubt, ERT required restructuring and an array of reforms (reduction in the number of high-level 
directors; removal of duplicate services; more autonomy among different divisions), but this should 
have been done under a strategic plan and after consultation with interested parties. It is a dangerous 
precedent to close down PSB entirely or even to link PSB reform to austerity. Greece is not the only 
country undergoing austerity measures and looking to cut public spending, and while some slimming 
of budgets is unavoidable, we need to consider carefully the position of PSB in these conditions and 
prevent such arbitrary axing becoming a trend. 
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